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kevin waite
Jefferson Davis and Proslavery Visions 
of Empire in the Far West
Snatching odd moments during sentinel duty at Fort Fauntleroy in New 
Mexico, William Need penned an urgent message to Secretary of War 
Simon Cameron in September 1861. Thousands of miles from the kill-
ing fields of Manassas, Virginia, where the Union army had gone down 
in defeat several months earlier, an equally ominous development was 
unfolding along the borderlands of the American Southwest. “The Texas 
rebels and Arizona cut-throats, like the ancient Goths and Vandals, are at 
the very gates,” threatening the entire western half of the continent, Need 
warned. That threat was especially dire, he added, as the territory lacked 
both the means and the will to beat back the rebel invaders. Indeed, New 
Mexico had been in the hands of proslavery military and political forces for 
years, and now, with Confederate secession, a longstanding southern plot 
to capture the Southwest seemed nearly inevitable. To ascertain the nature 
of rebel ambitions in the Southwest, Need wrote, Cameron should look 
no further than the Confederate chief himself. For more than a decade, 
Jefferson Davis had coveted the region, especially Arizona, “his beau ideal 
of a railroad route to the Pacific.” The region, Need continued, “was to him 
the terra incognita of a grand scheme of intercommunication and territo-
rial expansion more vast and complicated than was ever dreamed of by 
Napoleon Bonaparte in his palmiest days of pride and power.”1
Need’s fears were justifiable. And his assessment of Jefferson Davis’s 
western ambitions was hardly exaggerated. Beginning shortly after the 
U.S.-Mexico War, Davis directed his attention beyond the Mississippi and 
articulated a sweeping proslavery vision of empire in the West, a vision 
that would have grave consequences for the deepening political crisis 
between North and South. Perhaps no antebellum political figure had 
such a decisive impact on American development in the Far West. As a 
senator and secretary of war, Davis steered the antebellum debate on the 
transcontinental railroad, helped orchestrate the last American land-grab 
of the period, introduced a camel corps to the Southwestern desert, and 
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paved the way for the major overland mail route to the Pacific. Then, as the 
Confederate commander in chief, he channeled his political ambitions into 
military objectives, authorizing several invasions of the Southwest during 
the war.
Most biographies of Davis skate over his Trans-Mississippi ambitions, 
just as most histories of the sectional crisis overlook proslavery opera-
tions in the Far West. Davis’s role as Confederate president has served as 
something of a historiographical vortex, obscuring his contributions to 
the nation’s march westward before the war.2 More generally, there has 
been surprisingly little written on proslavery visions of empire in the 
Trans-Mississippi West. Although an excellent and growing body of litera-
ture—from the works of Robert May to Walter Johnson and now Matthew 
Karp—has enriched our understanding of antebellum southern imperial-
ism, the focus of this scholarship is largely confined to the Atlantic Basin.3 
Deservedly, the dramatic episodes in proslavery empire-building—such 
as the multiple attempts to seize Cuba and William Walker’s short-lived 
slaveholding republic in Nicaragua—have attracted their share of histori-
cal scrutiny. Yet such attention may distract from the less overtly violent, 
though ultimately more successful, proslavery push into the Far West.
With a limited perspective on proslavery expansionism, histories of the 
Civil War era generally suffer from geographic narrowness. Although his-
torians frequently cite the westward expansion of slavery as the key issue 
that led to the war, only rarely do they look beyond Bleeding Kansas.4 With 
a few notable exceptions, the existing scholarship gives the misleading 
impression that California, for instance, ceased to attract sectional contro-
versy after its admission as a free state in 1850. In these works, California 
makes only a fleeting appearance, receding from view upon the resolution 
of Henry Clay’s Omnibus Bill. Similarly, other parts of the Far Southwest—
including New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah—rarely figure into the political 
accounts of this period.5
Taking Davis and his geopolitics as a starting point, this article suggests 
new ways of thinking about the sectional crisis and the nature of proslavery 
expansion. It highlights episodes often deemed peripheral to the Civil War 
era to illustrate how the Far West—California and New Mexico, in particu-
lar—remained central to national politics throughout the period. Whereas 
historians have often overlooked sectional flashpoints such as the Gadsden 
Purchase, the U.S. camel corps, the Butterfield overland mail route, and 
the interminable Pacific railroad debates of the 1850s, contemporaries cer-
tainly did not. Davis played a crucial role at each juncture, bending the 
nation’s destiny toward a proslavery end, and in the process, foreground-
ing the Far West in the American political consciousness. His vision was 
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vast; his execution often successful. Davis’s was a dream predicated on 
commercial expansion as much as on territorial conquest, a dream depen-
dent not necessarily on the spread of human bondage so much as the insti-
tution’s political and economic influence, and a dream that almost outlived 
slavery itself.
■ It was also a dream many observers initially dismissed as impossible. 
During the tumultuous debates over the proposed Wilmot Proviso—
which would have excluded slavery from all territories recently taken from 
Mexico—some of the most influential politicians of the day insisted that 
slavery was naturally confined to the southeastern portion of the United 
States. It could not extend into the newly acquired Southwest by simple 
laws of climate. “What more do you want?” Henry Clay asked in early 1850. 
“You have got what is worth more than a thousand Wilmot provisos. You 
have nature on your side—facts upon your side—and thus truth staring you 
in the face, that there is no slavery in those territories.”6 Daniel Webster 
famously reiterated this point in no mixed terms. “Now, as to California 
and New Mexico, I hold slavery to be excluded from those territories by 
a law even superior to that which admits and sanctions it in Texas,” he 
argued in the Senate. “I mean the law of nature—of physical geography—
the law of the formation of the earth.”7 Even those who hailed from fur-
ther south than Webster’s Massachusetts and Clay’s Kentucky cast doubt 
on the profitability of slave agriculture in the Southwest. Writing to John 
C. Calhoun in December 1847, South Carolinian and former minister to 
Mexico, Waddy Thompson, warned that the region offered more in liabili-
ties than in profits. The land was ill-suited to the cultivation of cotton and 
sugar on a grand scale, he insisted, while transportation across the remote 
desert regions would pose perpetual problems.8
Others, however, were justifiably skeptical of this natural limits thesis, 
what the New York Daily Times dubbed a “clap-trap” argument, drummed 
up merely to defeat the Wilmot Proviso.9 Indeed, David Wilmot himself 
noted that African slavery had found its way into New Mexico as early as 
1847.10 Few were more critical of the natural limits argument than Horace 
Mann, a Whig congressman and educational reformer. In a series of publi-
cally circulated letters, he scolded Webster for his shortsighted acquies-
cence to the westward expansion of slavery. The institution would not obey 
the dictates of a “thermometer,” Mann warned. “Slavery depends, not upon 
Climate, but upon Conscience,” he wrote in 1850. “Wherever the wicked 
passions of the human heart can go, there slavery can go.” Even if slave 
agriculture proved unprofitable, however, the growing households of the 
Southwest would soon call for a hundred thousand domestic slaves, he 
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predicted. Furthermore, who was to say that gold in substantial quanti-
ties would not be found in New Mexico, as it had been in California a year 
earlier? “This is the very kind of labor on which slaves, in all time, have 
been so extensively employed,” Mann rightfully noted.11 His message was 
clear: unless checked by some external power, slavery would roll inexora-
bly westward.
In an exceedingly rare occurrence, Jefferson Davis agreed with the 
antislavery New Englander, Horace Mann. There was no reason, Davis 
argued again and again, to assume that slavery would not be profitable 
and adaptable in the Mexican cession. After all, most abolitionists clearly 
did not subscribe to the natural limits thesis themselves, he asserted. 
Otherwise, why go to such lengths to restrict slavery in the new territories? 
A relatively junior senator during the debates over what would become 
the Compromise of 1850, Davis distinguished himself by opposing this 
antislavery agenda for the West, what he called the “robber’s law.”12 With 
a small group of fellow southern statesmen, Davis pledged to “avail our-
selves of every means . . . to prevent the admission of California as a State 
unless her southern boundary be reduced to 36 deg. 30 min.”13 The new 
territories of New Mexico and California belonged largely to the South by 
right of conquest, he insisted on several occasions, as the slave states sac-
rificed a disproportionate amount of blood and treasure to wrest that land 
from Mexico.14
Rather than natural limits, Davis suggested, there were natural incen-
tives for the expansion of slavery. Although much of the region remained 
unknown, reports from hunters indicated that the lower Colorado River 
boasted “widespread and fruitful valleys.” Furthermore, there was always 
the prospect of gold, especially in the valleys around the Gila River.15 Like 
Mann, Davis predicted that slaves would soon be used profitably in min-
ing operations. To buttress these claims, he solicited reports on the min-
eral opportunities in the Gila Valley from the ongoing U.S.-Mexico joint 
boundary commission. The news he received from the commissioner, John 
R. Bartlett, was certainly heartening. Bartlett had it on good authority 
that the area around the Gila possessed a “richness . . . as a mineral region 
unsurpassed in New Mexico, both in Gold Silver & Copper.”16 Davis and 
his fellow advocates for the western expansion of slavery were being vindi-
cated. It certainly looked as if human bondage would pay in the Southwest.
Despite such economic incentives, Congress voted to block slavery in 
at least part of the Mexican cession, admitting California to the Union as 
a free state in September 1850.17 This setback galled Davis and his fellow 
slaveholding expansionists. James Henry Hammond lamented that the 
South would be made a “Hayti” after it lost California to free labor, while 
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Davis briefly considered snatching the California bill from the speaker 
of the Senate and “tearing it to pieces.”18 Scholars, perhaps taken in by 
the alarmist tone of their subjects, have represented this moment as the 
breaking point in slaveholders’ far western ambitions. Yet Davis and other 
southerners soon recognized what many subsequent historians have not: 
California, though technically free, was not a lost cause for slaveholders. 
Southern interests—that is, the political, commercial and cultural influ-
ence of slaveholders—could continue expanding westward, even in the 
absence of chattel slavery itself. Thus, Davis retained a strong interest 
in California politics throughout the 1850s, keeping up a regular corre-
spondence with several proslavery political operatives there. According to 
one such correspondent, Davis was the “champion” of southern émigrés 
in California, who looked to the Mississippi statesman to promote their 
interests on the Pacific slope.19 Over the course of the decade, he would not 
fail this trust.
■ From 1845 to the outbreak of the Civil War, no issue was more impor-
tant to western expansionists on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line than 
the Pacific railroad. Whether the first transcontinental railway would run 
across free soil or through slave country divided the nation along sectional 
lines. Northerners and southerners alike recognized that whichever sec-
tion won the railroad would not only gain access to California’s ports and 
the potentially lucrative Pacific trade; it would also control what would 
become the nation’s main commercial artery and all the states and territo-
ries it crossed. As the editor of the Arkansas State Gazette and Democrat 
optimistically projected in 1853: “When the road is finally completed to 
the Pacific . . . the State of California, and the States which will intervene 
between that and Texas, being so intimately identified with us, in their 
commercial relations, will, as a matter of course, from interest as well as 
sympathy, join with our division of the country, as a common community, 
contending for common rights.”20 In short, the political and commercial 
destiny of the Far West was up for grabs.
Southern railroad promoters began looking toward the Pacific when 
California was still a Mexican frontier territory. As early as 1836, expan-
sionists in Texas and New Orleans explored the possibility of extending 
lines to the Pacific Coast, musing about the commercial windfall such a 
project would bring to their respective regions.21 But the debate did not 
become national until 1845, when New York merchant Asa Whitney intro-
duced a memorial to Congress, outlining his plan for a railway from the 
Great Lakes into Oregon.22 Southerners rebutted, arguing that Whitney’s 
route was far too northerly and therefore subject to inclement weather.23 
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In a series of commercial conventions over the coming years, a grow-
ing proslavery railroad coalition emerged to articulate an alternative to 
Whitney’s plan. Although there would be significant disputes over which 
southern city should be designated the route’s eastern terminus, proslavery 
expansionists proved more systematic and far-seeing than their northern 
counterparts, keeping the prize of western commerce steadily within their 
sights.24 By the early 1850s this loose coalition—Jefferson Davis, J. D. B. 
De Bow, Matthew Fontaine Maury, James Gadsden, and William M. Gwin, 
among its most prominent members—emerged as a political force in pur-
suit of what abolitionists ominously dubbed “the great slavery road.”25
Davis took center stage in this campaign when he joined President 
Franklin Pierce’s cabinet as secretary of war in March 1853. With Congress 
divided over the desired route, Davis and other southerners moved ahead 
with a longstanding plan to secure additional territory along the Mexican 
border, thereby opening the way for a more direct line across the Southwest. 
At Davis’s urging, Pierce appointed a proslavery railroad booster, James 
Gadsden, to negotiate a land purchase from Mexico along the southwest-
ern border, in what is now southern New Mexico and Arizona.
That Davis singled out the South Carolinian for the job is hardly sur-
prising; Gadsden’s pedigree as a proslavery imperialist was unimpeach-
able. In 1851, he headed a group of planters who petitioned the California 
assembly to form a slaveholding colony in the southern part of the state, 
and planned to bring between five hundred and eight hundred slaves into 
the breakaway territory.26 His California-bound slaveholders would be pre-
ceded by a mounted corps and a team of engineers to survey the route to 
the Pacific, which could be used as a stage road and, later, a railway. “Open 
such a way, and the Railroad follows,” he declared, thus wedding his plans 
for a Pacific slave colony with his transcontinental railroad promotion.27 
When Gadsden entered formal negotiations with Mexico in late 1853, 
it was clear that his mission was of a thoroughly proslavery nature. Before 
departing for Mexico, Gadsden sought the counsel of his unofficial spon-
sor, Davis. “I should be pleased to hear from you, and to receive any sugges-
tions of importance relative to the mission,” he wrote Davis in May 1853. 
“I shall need the countenance & encouragement of my Southern Friends, 
as my appointment to Mexico is said to have been induced by my being a 
Southern Man.” As if there was any doubt, Gadsden pledged to “uphold 
& apply” the “principles of the South” in his forthcoming negotiations. 
Although Gadsden disguised such brazenly proslavery motives in his pub-
lic correspondence and statements, few were under any illusions. He went 
to Mexico as Davis’s handpicked man, an agent of the South, and a cham-
pion of the great slavery road.28
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Opponents of southern expansion condemned Gadsden’s work. When 
he returned to Washington in late December 1853 with a treaty calling for 
$15 million in exchange for nearly forty thousand square miles of Mexican 
territory, critics came out in force. “The friends of the Southern Pacific 
Railroad are the only bona fide supporters of the treaty,” a correspondent 
to the Philadelphia Public Ledger complained, “and it might just as well 
be called a ‘purchase of the right of way for a railroad to the Pacific,’ as by 
any other name.” That such an important diplomatic mission had been 
entrusted to a patently proslavery schemer was a serious breach of politi-
cal conduct, the correspondent added.29 According to the National Era, 
Gadsden’s negotiations had not only opened the way for a Pacific railroad 
“favored by Southern Nullifiers” but also handed the present “Slaveholding 
Administration” an opportunity to create two or three additional slaves 
states from the new territory.30 During deliberations in the House of 
Representatives, hot-headed Missourian Thomas Hart Benton deemed 
the treaty a monumental waste of money. A longtime supporter of a central 
transcontinental route, Benton ridiculed the prospects for railroad con-
struction through this new territory, “a country so utterly desolate, desert, 
and God-forsaken, that Kit Carson says a wolf could not make his living 
upon it.” He accused the treaty’s architects of orchestrating a vast conspir-
acy to push a Pacific railroad through barren borderlands and into New 
San Diego, a yet-to-be-built city where southern speculators would make 
untold fortunes.31
Ultimately, in the spring of 1854, the treaty passed over the strenuous 
objections of congressmen like Benton, although the Senate shaved nine 
thousand square miles and $5 million off the final agreement.32 Gadsden 
griped about the scaled-down version of his original deal, but his negotia-
tions had resulted in a decisive victory for proslavery expansionists: the 
final strip of land, measuring about thirty thousand square miles, provided 
crucial real estate for a southern railroad. Furthermore, it signaled that 
southern imperialists possessed the political capital necessary to advance 
their designs in the West at a time when sectional compromise was proving 
increasingly elusive. The last major territorial acquisition of the era, the 
Gadsden Purchase moved Jefferson Davis and his allies one step closer to 
fulfilling their ambitions in the West.
While Gadsden negotiated in Mexico, Davis opened yet another front 
in the southern railroad campaign. Passed in March 1853, the Pacific 
Railroad Survey bill authorized Davis, as secretary of war, to assemble 
teams to carry out a reconnaissance of the Trans-Mississippi West over a 
ten-month period—though topological work eventually stretched into late 
1854. The act was born out of a belief that scientific objectivity could break 
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the congressional logjam and settle the railroad question once and for all. 
Whereas sectional motives guided the nation’s statesmen, its engineers 
could presumably put aside politics in the interest of topological precision. 
Under great national scrutiny, six federally appointed engineers surveyed a 
total of four major routes: a northern route between the 41st and 42d par-
allels, a central route along the 38th parallel, a south-central route along 
the 35th parallel, and an extreme southern route along the 32d parallel.33
Yet scientific objectivity met its limits in Davis. Feigning sectional indif-
ference, the secretary of war proved eager to channel this opportunity to 
the South’s advantage, a fact not lost on political rivals like Thomas Hart 
Benton.34 To maintain the appearance of impartiality, Davis tactfully (or 
perhaps cunningly) appointed mostly northern topological officers. In his 
detailed summary of the surveys, however, he let his sectional bias shine. 
Starting with the northernmost survey, he systematically argued that every 
route except that along the 32d parallel faced severe obstacles: cost, length, 
climate, or a combination of all three. Meanwhile he dismissed, as mere 
trifles, serious impediments to the far southern route, such as a lack of 
water and timber. “A comparison of the results,” Davis wrote in his official 
report, “conclusively shows that the route of the 32nd parallel is, of those 
surveyed, ‘the most practicable and economical route for a railroad from 
the Mississippi river to the Pacific ocean.’”35 For him, this was a foregone 
conclusion, but for many others, his highly suspect summary was further 
proof of southern intrigue and slaveholders’ determination to drive the 
railroad through their section at any price.36
Although their desired railroad existed only on paper, southern imperi-
alists had cause for celebration. By 1854, a commercial empire stretching 
to the Pacific seemed close at hand for slavery’s cotton economy. Gadsden 
had negotiated a favorable purchase of land from Mexico. Davis was in 
control of the railroad surveys. Arkansas and Texas were poised to extend 
their railroad networks and link them with other burgeoning southern 
lines. And President Pierce seemed favorable to southern expansionist 
aims.37 Further, slaveholders could count on a powerful body of southern 
Californians to support a route through slave country. In the summer of 
1853, delegates at a San Diego convention resolved to promote the route 
along the Gila River into their city, and dispatched Col. John B. Magruder 
to press their case in Washington.38 The winds of history were blowing in a 
distinctly southerly direction.
Scholars of slaveholding imperialism would do well to examine more 
closely these southern railroad schemes. Whereas proslavery filibusters 
have more successfully captured the historical imagination, it was southern 
commercial expansionists who presented the greater threat to antislavery 
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northerners. In contrast to would-be conquistadors like William Walker 
and Henry A. Crabb, slaveholding railroad promoters largely controlled 
the levers of power in Washington and sustained a prolonged and multi-
pronged campaign to extend their political vision across the continent. 
Through their railroad boosterism, southerners articulated some of the 
most ambitious imperial objectives of this era. They actively pursued a 
project that would subdue and settle the West, tap the burgeoning mar-
kets of the Pacific Coast, boost the industrial capacity of the slave states, 
and unite the southern half of the continent along what would become 
its great commercial highway.39 And these were no mere pipe dreams, as 
their political opponents recognized. Indeed, northern leaders were des-
perate to check these proslavery aspirations and to advance competing 
visions of their own. The result was the longest-lived political controversy 
of the period: from 1845 until the outbreak of the Civil War, the Pacific 
railroad mired the question of western development in sectional rancor. 
As Jefferson Davis, among many others, recognized, the nation’s political 
destiny hinged on access to the Far West.
■ Between Davis and his fellow southern railroad promoters, the issue of 
funding presented a potential sticking point. Should individual states pay 
for railroad construction within their borders, or should the federal gov-
ernment bankroll the entire project? In other words, was such a sweeping 
federal undertaking—which even the most conservative estimates placed 
at over $100 million—compatible with the states rights position so many 
of these southern politicians claimed to represent?40 While some main-
tained that Pacific railroad development was best left to individual states, 
a majority of proslavery leaders agreed on the necessity of federal aid for 
such a project.41 
The buccaneering spirit of individual politicians explains much of this 
logic. After all, railroading was big business, and slaveholding leaders were 
just as eager as their Yankee counterparts to snatch the financial fruits of 
internal improvements. When it came to railroad development, southern 
politicians had been reaping the rewards of federal largess since 1850, 
when Congress began offering free land to railway corporations in order 
to incentivize settlement and development. The land was distributed in a 
checkerboard pattern, with alternating plots either available for sale to the 
public or given gratis to railroad companies. As historian Scott Reynolds 
Nelson illustrates, southern politicians were particularly adept at bend-
ing railroad legislation to proslavery ends. Senator David Rice Atchison of 
Missouri and his proslavery allies, for example, capitalized on land give-
aways for the benefit of themselves and their allies. Because of this clique, 
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writes Nelson, “when land grants to railroads began in 1850, most went 
either through southern states or toward them.”42
Southern Democrats could easily shelve their states’ rights scruples 
when properly enticed by the financial windfall of a transcontinental 
railroad through their region. Centralization at the federal level, which 
so many slaveholders decried through the 1850s and beyond, was only 
considered a menace when it threatened slavery and southern economic 
interests. As Davis knew all too well, strict constructionism had histori-
cally taken a backseat to imperial imperatives.43 For example, slavehold-
ers relinquished their states’ rights doctrine when presented with the 
opportunity to acquire Louisiana from France in 1807. They embraced 
federal power when, in the 1830s, the military cleared valuable plantation 
real estate by forcibly relocating Indians from lands in Florida, Georgia, 
Alabama, and Mississippi. They cheered the annexation of Texas and the 
conquest of New Mexico and California, again made possible only through 
overwhelming federal force. They cried foul when several northern legis-
latures turned states’ rights to their own advantage by passing so-called 
Personal Liberty Laws in opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. And 
they endorsed the federal judiciary when it handed down its proslavery 
ruling in the Dred Scott case. As the long history of proslavery politick-
ing makes clear, the only consistent element of the southern states’ rights 
mantra was its inconsistency. States’ rights was a banner to be unfurled 
whenever politically and economically expedient, then quietly stashed 
when the full force of the federal government was needed.44
In their maneuverings at the federal level, however, the slaveholding 
advocates of a Pacific railroad achieved only a pyrrhic victory. Bleeding 
Kansas is remembered today as perhaps the decisive flashpoint in the 
nation’s spiral toward civil war; at the time, however, it was seen largely as 
the byproduct of the intractable Pacific railroad feud. Indeed, the Kansas-
Nebraska Act of 1854 had its roots in opposition to the great slavery road.45 
As observers noted, railroad construction would have to be accompanied 
by white settlement along its path, and Nebraska, prime terrain for a cen-
tral railway, had been guaranteed to native populations since 1834. So 
long as Indian Country remained closed to white settlement, the odds on a 
northern route winning the Pacific railroad were slim. On the other hand, 
the 32d parallel route ran through lands—if occupied by potentially hos-
tile Indian tribes—at least open to white settlement. When it appeared as 
if the southern route had become the clear favorite, northerners moved 
with alacrity.
Benton took an early lead in campaigning for a railroad from St. Louis 
and for the accompanying organization of Nebraska, and soon thereafter 
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Willard Hall and William Richardson spearheaded a bill in the House. 
Just as the Senate was debating one of William Gwin’s southern-oriented 
Pacific railroad proposals in 1853, Hall made a plea for a more northerly 
route, accompanying the opening of Nebraska. “Why, everybody is talking 
about a railroad to the Pacific ocean,” he complained. “In the name of God, 
how is the railroad to be made if you will never let people live on the lands 
through which the road passes?” Without the organization of Nebraska, 
he rightly noted, Congress would likely be forced to settle on some point 
in Texas as the road’s eastern terminus.46 Overwhelming opposition from 
southerners in the Senate, including William Gwin, effectively killed the 
original bill.
Stephen Douglas revived the Nebraska question the next year, but this 
time with the support of the South. To gain these crucial votes he made 
what many northerners regarded as a Faustian bargain: his bill repealed 
the Missouri Compromise line, split the western territory into two halves—
Nebraska and Kansas—and left the slavery question to the dictates of 
popular sovereignty. Ironically, a bill that had as one of its aims the facil-
itation of another railroad route ultimately derailed the Pacific railroad 
debate.47 The ensuing conflict between free soilers and proslavery squat-
ters in Kansas pushed sectional tensions to a near breaking point and 
thus effectively foreclosed the possibility of compromise over a transcon-
tinental railroad. Northerners would not countenance a southern route, 
while southerners closed ranks against construction along a northern line. 
Congressmen would continue to agitate for various Pacific railroad routes, 
but with increasing jadedness. Of all the casualties produced by Bleeding 
Kansas, the most politically consequential was the Pacific railroad.48
And yet, southern dreams of a Pacific empire did not die on the bloodied 
soil of Kansas. These visions took a strange (and hairy) turn in 1855 when 
Jefferson Davis won another victory for infrastructural development in 
the Southwest. An American camel corps—funded by Congress, outfitted 
in the Middle East, and transported to the desert Southwest—was Davis’s 
grandest western initiative next to the Pacific railroad. The grandeur of this 
plan, however, was initially lost on fellow politicians, who nearly laughed 
Davis out of the Senate in 1851 when he first proposed a $30,000 con-
gressional appropriation to support this corps of thirty camels and twenty 
dromedaries in the American West. But when his fellow senators finally 
stopped laughing, they had to take stock of a serious proposal. Beginning 
with a modest appropriation, Davis had bold dreams for a camel corps 
as the new means of transportation in the Southwest. These animals, he 
argued, could be used to overcome the region’s powerful Indian tribes and 
provide protection for both settlers and mail routes. Davis praised the 
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camel as the “ship of the desert,” destined to become “the greatest stroke 
of economy which has ever been made in regard to transportation.”49 After 
four years of lobbying, he finally won his camel corps by 1855, with thirty-
four animals arriving in Texas a year later.50
Davis’s camel scheme was of a less patently proslavery nature than his 
railroad agitation, although it still had a decidedly southern flavor. After 
all, these camels were bound for the Southwest, across terrain Davis and 
others hoped would soon host a southern transcontinental railroad. As he 
recognized, railways and overland roads would not build themselves. They 
had to be carved out of Indian country and guarded against Native peo-
ples. Furthermore, almost two thousand miles separated the Pacific Coast 
from the Mississippi Valley, with no major intervening rivers crossing east 
to west. Camels, Davis reasoned, would help subdue this region and there-
fore expedite travel for westward-bound settlers. Easy transit across this 
southernmost corridor would facilitate the expansion of proslavery inter-
ests. “If we had a good railroad and other roads making it convenient to go 
through Texas into New Mexico, and through New Mexico into Southern 
California,” Davis mused privately to a friend in 1855, “our people with 
their servants, their horses and their cows would gradually pass westward 
over fertile lands into mining districts, and in the latter, especially, the 
advantage of their associated labor would impress itself upon others about 
them.”51 By this logic, slaveholding imperialism did not require grand con-
quests; it simply called for infrastructural development. And camels could 
play a vital part in bringing that about.
For years to come, Davis would defend his camel corps against accusa-
tions that the project was a thinly veiled proslavery plot.52 He had always 
been careful to maintain a nationalist, rather than sectional, posture 
whenever discussing the project, yet criticism persisted.53 Amid rising sec-
tional tensions, Congress refused to appropriate funds for the experiment 
in 1858, 1859, and 1860. By 1859 more than eighty camels were scattered 
across forts in California and Texas, but popular support for the project 
had waned. According to historian Thomas Connelly, the public could 
never quite look beyond the camel’s “personal habits of regurgitating on 
passersby or blowing a bloody bladder out of its mouth when frightened, 
its acute halitosis and general bad odor, its fierceness during rutting sea-
son, its voluminous sneeze, its shedding of large clumps of hair until it 
looked perfectly hideous, and its awkward appearance.”54 Camels, in short, 
did not endear themselves to American travelers.
Quixotic though this project may seem in hindsight, the camel corps 
highlights Davis’s commitment to southwestern development and his ver-
satility in bringing such dreams to fruition. He endured the initial derision 
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of Congress to pull off an expensive and logistically difficult operation. He 
persevered because camel transport was a key component in his vision for 
westward expansion, a link in a transportation network that would bring 
the slaveholding South into the Far West. Although the camel corps never 
measured up to its initial promise, Davis’s dreams of western empire would 
endure through yet another proslavery transportation scheme.
■ As Pacific railroad bills continued to languish in a divided Congress, a 
corollary project reignited southern hopes for western expansion and fur-
ther enflamed sectional animosities. Nearly forgotten by scholars today, the 
Butterfield overland mail route was a cause célèbre in the late 1850s and 
one of slaveholders’ greatest coups. The project did not begin as a sectional 
affair, however. In March 1857 Congress passed a $600,000 appropriation 
for the construction of an overland mail route from an undetermined point 
in the Mississippi Valley to San Francisco. The price tag was high, but the 
payoff, many congressmen reasoned, would be substantial. Not only would 
this new road provide faster, more regular mail service to the Pacific Coast, 
but it was also expected to offer a safe overland trail for westering emi-
grants. If successful, this route was also anticipated to become the precur-
sor to the long-awaited Pacific railroad. Iron rails, went the logic, would 
follow this emigrant’s trail, and east and west would finally be connected 
along a well-traveled, federally financed corridor.
To avoid the sort of sectional standoff that had so frequently stymied 
Pacific railroad bills, the route’s location was left to contractors, who began 
submitting bids in summer 1857. There was just one problem with this plan, 
however. His name was Aaron V. Brown, U.S. postmaster-general. Former 
law partner of James K. Polk, congressman, governor of Tennessee, and a 
champion of Texas annexation, Brown had established his credentials as an 
avowedly “strong Southern man.”55 Recently appointed postmaster-general 
by President Buchanan, Brown disliked all nine routes proposed by the 
bidders, likely because none passed south of Albuquerque. So Brown took 
it upon himself to designate a new route and forced all contractors to con-
form to his geographic strictures. In direct violation of the congressional 
act, he stipulated a bifurcated route beginning at St. Louis and Memphis 
(his hometown), then converging at Little Rock, before swinging through 
Texas to El Paso, Fort Yuma, and Los Angeles, and finally up the valleys of 
California to San Francisco. In total, his route added six hundred miles to 
the longest alternative bid.
In an era of brazen proslavery maneuvers, Brown’s rerouting of a con-
gressional act ranked near the top of the list. Although this overland road 
would not necessarily serve the expansion of chattel slavery itself, it would 
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advance the interests of the slave states through which it passed. As the 
logic went, settlers from these states would fan out along the route, and 
even if they failed to bring their slave property with them, they would cer-
tainly bring their proslavery politics, further strengthening ties between 
the South and the Far Southwest. As the Pacific railroad was ultimately 
expected to trace this mail route, Brown’s maneuver also marked a sig-
nal victory for the prospects of the great slavery road. “The route for a 
Southern railroad and the establishment of the Great Overland Mail line 
upon that route, are considered parts of the same system,” the Sacramento 
Daily Union lamented in December 1857. “Undertaken with the view of 
connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific,” these two projects were “devised” 
to enable “a population from the Southern States [to] naturally take pos-
session of the country over which the railroad and mail line will pass.”56 
Between the mail route and anticipated railroad, the westward flow of 
migrants and commerce would follow a decidedly southern course, thereby 
ensuring a continental reach for proslavery politics. Just as Davis pursued 
the lodestar of sectional aggrandizement at the expense of national inter-
ests, Brown ran roughshod over congressional mandates to advance a pro-
southern agenda in the West.57
Postmaster Brown did little to disguise his southern partisanship in 
his official report. Like Davis before him, he dismissed more northern 
routes as excessively cold and inaccessible. Along a northern route, the 
mail would not reach the Pacific Coast in the twenty-five-day window that 
the act stipulated. In addition to these delays, Brown argued, travelers 
would also be imperiled. He imagined passengers along an Albuquerque 
route, “benumbed by the cold for more than a week, overcome by the loss 
of sleep.” Such a route, “under circumstances of so much severe exposure, 
would, in a few years, mark every station with the fresh graves of its vic-
tims,” Brown concluded. He rightfully argued that the southernmost route 
was flatter and warmer, but implausibly claimed that it also suffered from 
less water scarcity than the alternatives. He invited northern opposition 
when he boasted that his mail route would link up with a vast southern 
transportation network, feeding off “all the great railroads of Virginia, 
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky . . . and New 
Orleans and Texas.”58
Brown struck a decidedly imperialist note in the final part of his report. 
Not only would this road contribute to southern transportation fortunes, 
help populate western territories, and bind the East to the Pacific, it would 
also facilitate southwestern empire along the U.S-Mexico border, poten-
tially serving as a springboard for future conquests. “In time of peace it 
will shed its blessings on both nations,” he argued, “whilst in time of war 
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it will furnish a highway for troops and munitions of war, which might 
enable us to vindicate our rights, and preserve untarnished our national 
honor.” Again, western transportation facilities and empire fit hand-in-
glove. Fittingly, Brown drew on another great western imperialist to jus-
tify his work: Jefferson Davis. He cited Davis as the ultimate authority, 
“who collected a larger amount of reliable information on this subject 
than any other person,” and who also favored this southernmost route.59 
Indeed, Brown’s arguments for a southern overland mail route and Davis’s 
earlier arguments for a southern transcontinental railroad are largely 
indistinguishable. Although Davis’s report only deepened the conflict over 
the Pacific railroad, it enjoyed something of an afterlife through Brown’s 
maneuverings and thus helped achieve a substantial proslavery victory in 
southwestern transportation.
With a southern overland mail route thus secured, the slave states 
applauded their newest champion. The Alexandria Gazette called Brown’s 
report “clear, simple, and comprehensive,” while the Memphis Daily 
Appeal cheered him as “able and masterly.” Brown, after all, had become 
a hometown hero in Memphis, and the Appeal took note: “The citizens of 
Memphis, especially, should thank and remember him for the strong stand 
he has taken for their city as a terminus, and for the unanswerable argu-
ments he has so successfully brought to bear to sustain it.”60 Shortly after 
the opening of the route, an observer in Texas noted that already “settle-
ments are rapidly extending westward along the route. Even at such an 
early stage in the road’s history, he concluded, “the Overland Mail Route 
is really a magnificent enterprise, and one of the greatest achievements of 
American progress.”61 President Buchanan, a strong southern sympathizer 
despite his Pennsylvania origins, was equally jubilant. “It is a glorious tri-
umph for civilization and the Union,” he announced. “Settlements will 
soon follow the course of the road, and the East and the West will be bound 
together by a chain of living Americans, which can never be broken.”62
Northern outrage was proportional to the audacity of Brown’s act. The 
Chicago Tribune called it “one of the greatest swindles ever perpetrated 
upon the country by the slave holders,” while an equally indignant Ohio 
State Journal dubbed it “a shameful outrage” and a “revolution of law.”63 
The road would enrich not only the slave states, the Journal added, but 
Brown himself, who purportedly owned real estate across the route he 
selected.64 Meanwhile, the National Era protested, “the South demanded 
the sacrifice of the public convenience upon the altar of Slavery propagan-
dism, and the South must be gratified at every cost.”65 The San Francisco 
press echoed many of these complaints, noting that all mail and passen-
gers would have to be routed through Los Angeles, a proslavery bastion, 
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before ultimately reaching the much more populous areas around the San 
Francisco Bay. “Under the miserably short-sighted policy of the Executive,” 
the San Francisco Bulletin complained, “California is made to suffer, and 
the public Treasury is robbed”—and all for a route that passed too far south 
to attract a critical mass of passenger traffic.66 These faultfinders could 
have applied to this overland road what was once said of the regional San 
Antonio-San Diego line: It was a route “from no place through nothing 
to nowhere.”67
Northern and Border State congressmen also lambasted Brown’s road, 
linking it to a longer history of proslavery scheming in the Far Southwest. 
In a lengthy and impassioned speech, Representative Francis Blair of 
Missouri connected the dots between the Gadsden Purchase, Davis’s Pacific 
railroad surveys, the camel corps, and now this overland mail route. “Why 
was it that an appropriation of $10,000,000 to purchase Arizona, appro-
priations to import camels, to bore artesian wells, and to print an endless 
series of the most costly books . . . could be made during the dominancy 
of the so-called Democracy, and no effort whatever made to find a line for 
the central route?” Blair demanded. The answer, of course, was simple. 
The “southern faction” forced the hand of both the executive and Congress 
to “dictate absolutely its policy.” The newest outrage, Brown’s overland 
mail road, was yet another example of proslavery expansionists sacrific-
ing national interests and considerable capital to advance their sectional 
agenda, Blair added.68 In later debates in the senate, other critics piled on. 
Lyman Trumbull slammed the postmaster general for overriding congres-
sional will to build a road “as crooked as an ox-bow” and a good deal longer 
than originally advertised.69 To Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, 
the new mail road would pass along a “desert route, now and hereafter to 
be known, I trust, as the disunion route.”70 As these congressmen recog-
nized, the stakes were high in the contest for western transportation, and 
slaveholders again held the winning hand.
Despite hearty protest, in September 1857 A.V. Brown awarded the 
contract to John Butterfield, a New York expressman and personal friend 
of President Buchanan. Twice-weekly mail service was to begin one year 
later, a formidable task even with the resources at Butterfield’s disposal. 
He had to construct a road that ran over twenty-eight hundred miles of 
terrain that, for much of its expanse, was sparsely populated, rugged, and 
short on water. There was also the problem of Indian tribes. To secure the 
right-of-way through their lands, Butterfield would distribute more than 
$10,000 per year to Native Americans in the region. His team also dug a 
series of wells along the route and constructed roughly two hundred sta-
tions. For the transport work ahead, the line purchased a hundred coaches, 
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a thousand horses, five hundred mules, and recruited nearly eight hun-
dred men. All told, it was an impressive undertaking, and by 1860 the 
Butterfield line was carrying more letters than the U.S. steamship service. 
Although the vast majority of westward migrants continued to use the 
central overland trail, settlements along the Butterfield route grew con-
siderably, especially in Texas. The population of chief towns on the route 
nearly doubled, while smaller settlements also sprang up near its path. In 
these new towns, the line’s stations often served as the commercial cen-
ter.71 Ultimately the line would not outlive the sectional crisis that it did 
so much to exacerbate. The famed but short-lived Pony Express, which 
followed a central route, originated in 1860 as a response to the far south-
ern Butterfield road. With secession, the Butterfield company moved its 
operations to the central line, although Confederates continued to move 
over the old route.72
The Butterfield line could be considered the postscript to over a decade 
of proslavery scheming for a transcontinental railroad. Southerners did 
not win their great slavery road, but with the establishment of the overland 
mail route, they secured what many considered the next best thing. The 
Butterfield line only accelerated the migration and commercial exchange 
that had been conducted between the slave states and the Desert West 
for decades. And it stood as a physical embodiment of the link connect-
ing South and Southwest. That the route was established over the fierce 
resistance of northern politicians highlights just how adept southerners 
had become in advancing their western agenda. Between the Gadsden 
Purchase, Jefferson Davis’s camel corps, the Pacific railroad surveys, and, 
finally, the overland mail route slaveholders consistently outmaneuvered 
their adversaries to dictate infrastructural policy for the Far West.
■ Although the Butterfield road never carried the mass of southern 
migrants that its champions once hoped, Jefferson Davis and his fellow 
proslavery expansionists could nevertheless look back on a decade of west-
ern scheming with satisfaction. They had, after all, dominated the debate 
over southwestern expansion at nearly every turn. And their political 
opponents understood this, as Blair’s comments in Congress make clear. 
Even though chattel slavery failed to take deep root in southwestern soil, 
the extension of slave-based plantation agriculture had never been the 
single-minded focus of these expansionists. Southerners like Davis lusted 
after a commercial and political domain from one end of the continent to 
the other, an empire of influence that would wed the Far West firmly to the 
fortunes of the slave South. And by the eve of the Civil War, that empire 
seemed within reach.
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The ostensibly free state of California, for instance, had aligned itself 
with the slave South throughout the 1850s. The Mississippi planter–cum–
California senator, William Gwin, set the state on a proslavery course for 
nearly the entire decade. He also proved a tireless champion of the Pacific 
railroad, with a clear preference for the far southern route. During the 
election of 1860, California’s entire congressional delegation supported 
the proslavery presidential candidate, John C. Breckinridge. Abraham 
Lincoln may have carried California, but he did so by the smallest per-
centage of ballots in any free state.73 Southerners had shuttled hundreds 
of black slaves into California during the gold rush, and legislators and 
jurists protected that property long after California outlawed slavery in its 
1849 constitution. The fugitive slave code of 1852, for instance, enabled 
slaveholders to retain their chattel, so long as they eventually returned 
them to the South. In dozens of cases, state courts upheld this law and 
refused to liberate slaves on California’s technically free soil. In addition 
to an estimated six hundred to fifteen hundred black slaves who labored 
in California over the course of this period, there were untold numbers of 
unfree Native American laborers.74 One Tennessee transplant, Cave Couts, 
established a southern-style plantation outside San Diego, using Native 
debt peons instead of black slaves.75 California was not the plantation 
South; but in the eyes of substantial numbers of slaveholding émigrés like 
Couts, it was a viable alternative.
Slaveholders could also look favorably on developments in the ter-
ritory of New Mexico. In early 1859, the territorial legislature outraged 
antislavery forces when it passed a draconian slave code.76 It was a vic-
tory, not necessarily for the handful of slaveholders within the territory, 
but for southern politicians, like Jefferson Davis, who craved greater influ-
ence over the Southwest. Here was proof that New Mexico’s commercial 
and political connections to the South, especially Missouri, translated into 
sweeping proslavery enactments. The territorial delegate, Miguel Otero—
who had married into a powerful Charlestonian family—recognized that 
such an act would further cement New Mexico’s alliance to the slave South, 
or would, in his words, attract “greater . . . political attentions from the 
States.”77 When the territory’s speaker of the house attempted to repeal 
the bill, he was branded a Black Republican and stripped of his speaker-
ship.78 With a territorial secretary from Mississippi, a governor from North 
Carolina, and the leading newspaper editor from Missouri, New Mexico’s 
leadership was firmly in the proslavery column. It could be difficult to 
determine where the slave South ended and the Far West began.
If slaveholders could count on sympathy from New Mexico, they could 
expect absolute fealty from Arizona. Although still technically part of New 
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Mexico, Arizonians had developed a strong sense of regional identity after 
years of petitioning for separate territorial status. With a politically power-
ful white population, overwhelmingly southern in origin and proslavery in 
outlook, there was no secret as to where the proposed territory’s loyalties 
would lie. Not surprisingly, slaveholders like Senator Gwin, Thomas Rusk 
of Texas, Albert Gallatin Brown of Mississippi, and Jefferson Davis himself 
supported Arizona’s territorial bids.79 Although the region never won its 
separate territorial status before the Civil War, Davis could congratulate 
himself on the fact that the Gadsden Purchase lands, which constituted a 
significant portion of Arizona, had attracted such a fervent proslavery pop-
ulation. The depth of the region’s proslavery commitment became clear 
when the secession movement swept westward from the Deep South. In 
March 1861 a convention of Arizonians met at Mesilla and unanimously 
adopted a series of secessionist resolutions, denouncing the “present Black 
Republican administration” and vowing to “resist any officers appointed to 
this Territory by said administration with whatever means in our power.”80
Arizona had therefore declared its allegiance to the Confederacy—
before Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina. When a federal 
agent arrived in the breakaway territory in late spring 1861, he was met by 
a hostile crowd of secessionists who warned him that they had “a fine bar-
rel of tar, into which they will put the first officer appointed by President 
Lincoln, feather him, and start him out to fly.”81 Writing from Mesilla in 
June 1861, a unionist observer could only lament, “This country is now 
as much in the possession of the enemy as Charleston is.”82 The Gadsden 
Purchase of 1853 was paying dividends as Confederates eyed a western 
empire in 1861.
■ From the first flush of secession to the rebellion’s collapse, Jefferson 
Davis—now president of the Confederate States of America—never turned 
his back on the Far West. Although he recognized that the war would be 
won or lost in the major military theaters of the East, and thus directed 
the vast majority of Confederate troops and materiel there, he contin-
ued to entertain grand schemes in the Trans-Mississippi West, at times 
even diverting scarce resources to that theater. What Davis had coveted 
for roughly a decade—access to the Pacific Coast along a far southern 
corridor—he could now pursue more aggressively through his own mili-
tarized state. Indeed, to secure an outlet to the Pacific remained the over-
riding Confederate objective in the West.83 Access to California’s ports 
would enable the Confederacy to circumvent the stranglehold that the 
federal blockade had imposed along the Atlantic seaboard. In the pro-
cess, Confederates hoped to secure the mineral wealth of Colorado and 
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especially California. With these objectives in mind, the rebel government 
targeted the Far Southwest for its first invasion of the war.
It was a modest invasion, to be sure. But with only 258 Texans, Col. John 
Baylor managed to beat back larger Union forces in several engagements 
in New Mexico. By August 1, 1861, he had declared Arizona a Confederate 
territory, with Mesilla as its capital. Arizona, a longstanding hotbed of 
proslavery activity, now had the protection of a Confederate army and the 
legitimacy of a Confederate government. Writing to colleagues and supe-
riors, Baylor trumpeted the territory’s “vast mineral resources” and its 
geographic position “affording an outlet to the Pacific.”84 He also looked 
eagerly to California, where he expected to draw reinforcements from its 
substantial pro-Confederate population. “California is on the eve of a revo-
lution,” he reported, with “many Southern men there who would cheer-
fully join us if they could get to us.”85 The California revolution of Baylor’s 
dreams never materialized, but substantial Confederate activity, especially 
within Los Angeles County, forced Union officials to garrison the southern 
part of the state, diverting needed troops from the theater in New Mexico. 
Just as many southern Californians supported the great slavery road dur-
ing the antebellum period, they would continue to aid the proslavery cause 
during the war itself.86
Although Davis repeatedly insisted that his government sought “no 
conquest, no aggrandizement,” his imperialist intentions were clear to 
anyone in the Far West during these early months of the war.87 As Baylor 
consolidated control over Arizona, Davis authorized a far larger invasion 
force into the Southwest. Under the command of Gen. Henry Hopkins 
Sibley, a rebel army of roughly twenty-seven hundred men, along with 
four thousand animals and three hundred wagons, marched across Texas 
and into New Mexico in the fall of 1861. By March 1862 Sibley captured 
the New Mexican capital, Santa Fe, and seemed poised for further con-
quests. According to one of Sibley’s top lieutenants, “The objective aim and 
design of the campaign was the conquest of California.”88 Yet these high 
hopes turned to dust under the region’s blistering sun. By the summer of 
1862 Texan invaders were beating a hasty retreat in the face of mounting 
operational difficulties and military setbacks: the loss of supply wagons 
at Glorieta Pass, advancing Union forces, Indian attacks, and, as Megan 
Kate Nelson has argued, devastating attrition caused by the environmen-
tal challenges of the region.89 Sibley’s once victorious invasion force had 
been reduced to a bobtail. With his defeat passed the high water mark of 
Confederate empire in the Far West.90
Still, despite this setback, proslavery western fantasies persisted for 
years, a fact often overlooked by historians. The Confederacy was never 
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able to mount another far western invasion on the scale of Sibley’s opera-
tion, but not for lack of trying. Davis would authorize several ambitious 
southwestern campaigns before the war was out. Meanwhile, Confederate 
operatives on the Pacific Coast hatched plans to frustrate the Union war 
effort with the limited resources at their disposal. For instance, a band of 
Confederate irregulars launched a small-scale guerilla war in California, 
robbing a gold-laden stagecoach and killing a police officer while wound-
ing several others in a series of shootouts. According to the second-in-com-
mand, “Our object was to raise an insurrection in California, if we were 
molested.”91 They never managed to generate a widespread insurrection, 
but, along with several other Confederate schemers, they kept unionist 
officials in the Far West on high alert.
Some of those Confederate western operations took the shape of piracy. 
In an anonymous, open letter to President Lincoln, proslavery journalist 
Edward Pollard claimed that Confederate pirates “will scour the South 
Pacific as well as other oceans of the world; they will penetrate into every 
sea, and will find as tempting prizes in the silk ships of China as in the 
gold-freighted steamers of California.”92 Davis was more cautious about 
embracing open piracy, but he did show “great interest” when California 
secessionist Asbury Harpending presented a plan to seize Union gold ship-
ments leaving from Pacific ports. According to Harpending, Davis claimed 
that intercepting that cargo “would be more important than many vic-
tories in the field.”93 Harpending received a captain’s commission in the 
Confederate navy and with the backing of two coconspirators, purchased 
the J. M. Chapman, a ninety-ton schooner moored in San Francisco Bay. 
Together, the men secretly armed the ship with two twelve-pound can-
nons and staffed it with Confederate sympathizers. The plan was to sail 
to Mexico, seize the first three eastbound Pacific Mail steamers, confis-
cate the ships’ gold and silver, and deliver their booty to the Confederate 
treasury. Unfortunately for Harpending, his navigator betrayed the plot 
and local police and a detachment of Marines raided the Chapman.94 
Although Harpending never made it to the high seas, his scheme threw 
San Francisco into a panic. “These men of the Chapman . . . committed a 
treason as grave as any that ever was, or ever could be, committed,” cried 
the Alta California. “That of Arnold was not baser or more malicious.”95 
The press raised the cry for the execution of the Chapman conspirators 
and demands poured into Washington for additional military protections 
for San Francisco’s harbor.96 Just a year later, the Confederate high com-
mand authorized another naval expedition to disrupt the Union’s Pacific 
trade. But again, Union officials foiled the plot before it could be set 
in motion.97
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Davis’s dream of a western empire proved hard to kill, even as his forces 
faced defeat from one end of the continent to the other. While Ulysses S. 
Grant’s army began its long push into Confederate Virginia, Davis autho-
rized the most fanciful western invasion yet. The eccentric writer and 
adventurer Lansford Hastings, whose infamous guidebook led the Donner 
party to its fatal journey across the Sierra Nevada in 1847, had proposed 
to raise a force of three thousand to five thousand California Confederates 
for the purpose of retaking Arizona and thereby securing a “connecting 
link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.”98 Although Hastings had no 
military experience and few credentials in general, Davis commissioned 
him a major in the Confederate military in early 1864.
Hastings made little headway, yet Davis refused to abandon the Far 
West. With his entire government in disarray and his armies in shambles, 
the Confederate commander-in-chief turned to John Baylor once again, 
overruling the war department to endorse a final far western invasion plan 
early the next year. Baylor was to raise a force of roughly ten thousand 
men from Texas, Arizona and California to repeat his earlier exploits on a 
grander scale and reclaim the Southwest.99 On March 25, 1865, two weeks 
before Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, Baylor received his colonel’s com-
mission and began recruiting troops. The war ended before Baylor could 
begin his campaign, yet Arizona rebels were still trying to muster their 
own invasion weeks after the Confederacy had, for all intents and pur-
poses, ceased to exist.100 Thus, Davis’s dreams of empire continued to enjoy 
an afterlife in the region he had done so much to shape.
■ Taking seriously Jefferson Davis’s geopolitical vision opens a new, more 
capacious way of thinking about proslavery imperialism. To be sure, Davis 
and his allies hoped to export chattel slaves to the furthest reaches of the 
continent. Yet his expansionist objectives did not rely solely, or even mainly, 
on the acquisition of more territory for plantation agriculture. Instead, he 
advanced a sweeping vision for a sphere of influence, built on commercial 
and political networks and buttressed by a vast transportation infrastruc-
ture, as the means to establish southern dominion over the Far West. This 
was a particularly nimble, resilient, and largely successful brand of expan-
sionism. Whereas southern filibusters failed in their attempts to seize 
Cuba and held Nicaragua for just a few short and bloody years, proslavery 
expansionists in the West could claim more lasting victories. Slaveholders 
may have lost California to free labor—albeit only technically—but they 
continued to push their far western agenda to great effect throughout the 
coming decade. Between the Gadsden Purchase, the Pacific railroad sur-
veys, the camel corps, and the Butterfield mail road, southerners set the 
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course of southwestern development. Northern politicians recognized as 
much when they attempted to derail these projects.
Taking seriously Davis’s vision of western empire also offers a fresh 
perspective on the familiar narrative of the sectional crisis. Contrary to 
the standard account, slaveholders did indeed cast their gaze far beyond 
bleeding Kansas. As Davis’s agenda makes clear, southerners transformed 
the Far Southwest into a sectional battleground in the decade after the 
Compromise of 1850. Ultimately it was a place made by slaveholders, 
even if the region never supported a robust system of chattel slavery. By 
1860 California boasted an ardently proslavery congressional delegation; 
New Mexico and Utah had passed slave codes; and Arizona was argu-
ably more “southern”—that is, more proslavery and secessionist—than the 
Upper South. When war broke out, Confederates justifiably looked to this 
region as a source of fresh recruits and as a thoroughfare to the Pacific. 
Even as their cause faltered in the larger theaters of the East, Davis and the 
Confederate high command continued to nurture their fantasies of empire 
in the West. Of course, these visions of empire ultimately went the way of 
the Confederacy as a whole. But at least for a period, it seemed as if the 
slave South would continue marching west.
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